Foundation Models and Demonstration Data
Preference finetuning aims to get AI models to behave according to human preference, which the source calls an ambitious, if not impossible, goal.
Fluency Is Not Direction
Imagine a language model that has become very good at producing fluent, helpful text. It can explain a tax form, draft a cover letter, or summarize a long report. Now ask a harder question: is that model's skill enough to decide what it should do with its abilities? The same fluency that helps someone write a clear apology can also help someone write a convincing scam. Skill does not answer the question of direction.
This is the starting point for preference finetuning. Once a model is good at producing helpful text, the open question becomes which kinds of responses it should produce and which it should decline. This article follows a common path for beginners: we begin with a belief that seems reasonable, test it against a concrete question, and see where it breaks down. Along the way you will meet RLHF, the earliest successful preference finetuning algorithm, and its reward model component.
What do you think happens?
Suppose you train a model only on demonstrations of excellent conversations, written the way a model should write them. Does that training tell the model which conversations it should hold?
Reveal answer
No, because demonstrations teach how to hold a conversation, not which conversations to hold.
Demonstration data shows the model examples of good work. That teaches the skill of conversing. The judgment about which conversations are appropriate is a different thing, and demonstrations do not supply it.
Skill Versus Judgment
Demonstration data is a collection of examples of a model doing a task well, such as conversations written the way models should write them. Training on this data teaches the model how to hold a conversation.
The key limit is that demonstration data does not, by itself, teach the model which conversations it should hold. The source is direct about this: the skill and the judgment are different things, and demonstrations supply only the skill. A model trained on excellent examples can write well in many situations, including situations where it should not be writing at all. Nothing in the examples tells it where the boundary lies.
The diagram below separates the two things a learner might confuse. On one side is what demonstration data provides. On the other is the target that preference finetuning is trying to reach. Notice that the second column depends on an assumption that the first column never has to make.
The Assumption Hidden in the Goal
A tempting assumption goes like this: people broadly agree on what is good, so if we collect enough good behavior and teach it to a model, the model will simply behave well. Under this view, human preference is a single target that can be copied into a machine. The goal of preference finetuning is to get AI models to behave according to human preference, and this tempting view makes that goal sound easy.
The source calls this goal ambitious, if not impossible. The reason is that the goal rests on two assumptions. The first is that universal human preference exists. The second is that it is possible to embed that preference into an AI system. Both assumptions have to hold for the goal to be reachable as stated.
The first assumption is the harder one to justify. People come from different backgrounds and often disagree about what is good. Preference finetuning therefore has to reduce many different views to something a model can be trained on. Where that reduction loses information, the model is learning a simplified target, not the full range of what people actually prefer.
A team builds an assistant that answers questions about a divisive public issue. They gather many example answers from people they consider thoughtful and train the assistant on them. Users from different communities then react differently: some find the answers biased, others find them too evasive. The team did not fail to collect good examples. The problem is that 'good' meant different things to different readers, so no single set of examples could match every reader's preference.
Two Ways to Get It Wrong
One natural reaction to controversy is to make the model cautious about every sensitive subject. This sounds safe, but the source points out that it has its own cost. Whatever a model says about a controversial issue, some users will be upset. If the model is censored too much, it may become boring and drive users away. The source also observes that fear of inappropriate responses can stop companies from releasing their applications to users at all.
The opposite extreme is a model that is too permissive. Because the same capability that helps people accomplish useful things can help them accomplish harmful things, a model that answers everything without judgment can be used to cause harm. The two extremes are not symmetric errors that can be fixed with one simple rule. Each has a cost, and the diagram shows where a useful middle ground sits between them.
A support chatbot is changed to refuse every question that touches a sensitive topic. Complaints rise because customers with ordinary questions get refusals. The developers conclude that the new refusal rule fixed the harm problem, but they have only moved the failure from harmful answers to unhelpful ones. Both are costs. The fix is not another blanket rule but a judgment about which responses to give and which to decline.
Where RLHF Begins
RLHF stands for Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback. The source identifies it as the earliest successful preference finetuning algorithm and as one that remains popular today. It is the concrete method, while the preference goal explains why the method exists.
The source says RLHF consists of two parts. The first part is to train a reward model that scores the foundation model's outputs. Read that part carefully for direction of information. The foundation model produces outputs. The reward model takes those outputs and assigns a score to each one. Trace this flow step by step.
- 1Step 1: The foundation model receives a prompt and generates candidate outputs.
- 2Step 2: Each candidate output is passed to the reward model.
- 3Step 3: The reward model assigns a score to each output.
- 4Step 4: The scores are the signal that the first part of RLHF produces.
The pipeline stops at the score because that is where the source's description of the first part stops. It does not name the second part of RLHF, so this article does not describe it. What you can take from the first part is that the reward model turns each foundation model output into a score, and that score is what carries the preference goal into training.
Trace a Response Through the First Stage
A foundation model is given one prompt and produces three candidate responses, A, B, and C. Trace what happens to each one in the first part of RLHF. Then state what the reward model gives you, and name one thing the first part of RLHF, as the source describes it, does not tell you.
Hints
- Start with the foundation model. Which component produces the outputs, and how many are there?
- Ask what the reward model does with each output. Does it generate text, or does it assign something?
- Look at what the source says the passage stops before naming. That gap is the answer to the last part.
Common Mistakes
Common mistake Believing that enough good demonstrations will teach a model which conversations to hold
What it looks likeTraining only on excellent example conversations and expecting the model to know when it should decline a request.
Why it failsDemonstration data teaches the skill of conversing. It does not teach the judgment about which conversations are appropriate.
Do this insteadRecognize that demonstrations supply skill, and that preference finetuning is aimed at the separate question of direction.
Common mistake Treating human preference as one agreed-upon target
What it looks likeAssuming that people broadly agree on what is good, so any well-chosen set of examples captures what everyone wants.
Why it failsThe goal rests on the assumption that universal human preference exists, and disagreement across backgrounds makes that hard to justify.
Do this insteadTreat the reduction of diverse preferences to a training signal as a simplification that can lose information.
Common mistake Assuming that heavy censorship is the safe choice
What it looks likeRefusing every question on a sensitive topic and calling the result safe.
Why it failsExcessive censorship has its own cost. The model can become boring, drive users away, and stop applications from being released.
Do this insteadTreat both harmful answers and excessive censorship as costs, and look for the balance between them.
Common mistake Confusing the foundation model with the reward model
Why it failsThe foundation model produces outputs, while the reward model assigns a score to each output.
Do this insteadKeep the direction of information in mind: outputs flow from the foundation model into the reward model.
Key Takeaways
- Demonstration data teaches a model how to have a conversation but not what kind of conversations it should have.
- The goal of preference finetuning assumes universal human preference exists and can be embedded into AI, which the source calls an ambitious, if not impossible, goal.
- Both harmful answers and excessive censorship carry costs, so good behavior requires balancing them rather than refusing everything.
- RLHF, the earliest successful preference finetuning algorithm, begins by training a reward model that scores the foundation model's outputs.